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 Confidence and secu-
 rity building measures (CSBMs) have long been the neglected stepchild of
 serious arms control analysis. Some view CSBMs as "arms control junk
 food,"'1 frivolous, unworkable, or even detrimental. Others are so enamored
 of the concept that they expect proposals to be accepted as prima facie desir-
 able. After all, the very term "confidence and security" connotes stability
 and peace. The problem with both positions is often the dearth of hard
 analysis in support of the ideas put forward and the abstract nature of the
 discussions of "security building."2 As witnessed in the contrast between the
 quiet success of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and the disastrous
 Trojan Horse episode of ancient Greece, CSBMs can have good or bad results.
 It is necessary to sort out analytically which CSBMs make sense to enhance
 security in Europe. This study aims to do that in the case of one important
 type of CSBM: constraints on the military ground exercises of NATO and the
 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO or Warsaw Pact).
 Military exercises have been a focal point of CSBM efforts at least as far
 back as the Helsinki Accord of 1975 (see Appendix). They retain high visibility
 today as Gorbachev's artful diplomacy includes far-ranging proposals for
 limitations on military activities. Measures affecting exercises also deserve
 attention because both NATO and the WTO face substantial changes in their
 The authors would like to thank the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation for sup-
 porting the preparation of this article.
 Robert D. Blackwill, who contributed to this article while a faculty member of the John F. Kennedy School
 of Government at Harvard University, is now Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet
 Affairs at the National Security Council. Jeffrey W. Legro is a Fellow at the RAND/UCLA Center for
 Soviet Studies and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at UCLA.
 1. The term comes from Strobe Talbott's Deadly Gambits (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), p. 323.
 The focus of Talbott's book is on nuclear forces, but similar attitudes exist in the conventional
 realm.
 2. A conference of experts on security affairs noted the need to link operational military concerns
 to general security principles, particularly in the area of conventional warfare issues. See Joseph
 S. Nye, Jr., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference
 on the State of the Field," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 22-24.
 International Security, Winter 1989/90 (Vol. 14, No. 3)
 ?D 1989 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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 training patterns, opening opportunities and risks for European security.
 Would significant, verifiable constraints on the exercises of both sides en-
 hance NATO's security, by improving its ability to respond effectively to
 Eastern aggression, more than these measures would degrade the West's
 capability to defend? An adequate answer to this question requires an ex-
 amination of: 1) the purposes and nature of military exercises in Europe;
 2) the goals and content of constraint proposals; and 3) the trade-offs involved
 in accepting mutual limitations on training.
 The Purposes and Dimensions of NATO and Warsaw Pact Exercises
 NATO and Warsaw Pact exercises have both military and political objectives.
 Each side aims to match its combat capabilities to its strategy while enhancing
 the unity and integration of its alliance. Beyond these general similarities,
 however, the two blocs' maneuvers have traditionally had different military
 and political aims which are described below in three categories: 1) alliance-
 wide reinforcement exercises; 2) national ground force exercises; and 3) multi-
 national ground force exercises.3
 NATO REINFORCEMENT EXERCISES. Timely reinforcement is an integral part
 of NATO's plan for forward defense. After the first week of mobilization,
 NATO reinforcements would come largely from America. At present the
 United States should be able to send six active-duty army divisions to Europe
 within ten days of notification; equipment for these units is to be stored at
 POMCUS (Pre-positioned Overseas Materiel Configured to Unit Sets) sites.4
 The United States practices this reinforcement, usually in the autumn,5 by
 transporting one to two divisions (approximately 17-35,000 men) to Europe
 in the exercise "REFORGER" (REturn of FORces to GERmany). This move-
 ment, of primarily active-duty soldiers, is complex and involves much more
 than simple flights to the continent. First, some equipment such as helicop-
 3. Unless otherwise noted, exercise data presented in this article is based on information made
 public pursuant to the exercise notification provisions contained in the 1975 Conference on
 Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Helsinki Final Act and the 1986 Conference on
 Disarmament in Europe (CDE) Stockholm Accord.
 4. Soviet Readiness for War: Assessing One of the Major Sources of East-West Instability, Report of the
 Defense Policy Panel, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 100th Cong.,
 2d sess., December 5, 1988, p. 10. The U.S. commitment calls for 10 divisions in ten days, but
 only six have most of their equipment pre-positioned in Europe.
 5. In 1979 and 1986, REFORGER took place in the winter. REFORGER is also scheduled for
 winter in 1990.
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 ters and vehicles is sent by sea because pre-positioned weapons and supplies
 are incomplete for supporting heavy divisions.6 The soldiers are assembled
 in the United States, and airlift must be readied, loaded, and flown. The
 troops disembark in Western Europe, clear the airfield, and then must be
 transported to the POMCUS sites, where they draw weapons and equipment
 and load up with fuel and ammunition. In addition, the materiel that has
 been sealifted to Europe must be offloaded and joined with the military
 forces that will use it. Finally, the troops travel to the areas in West Germany
 where they will fulfill their designated combat missions, such as plugging a
 hole in the front line or acting as a strategic reserve.
 In addition to testing these U.S. capabilities, REFORGER also exercises the
 personnel, facilities, and equipment of European countries that are central
 to the reinforcement effort. Under Host-Nation Support agreements,7 indi-
 vidual countries on the continent are committed to assisting arriving U.S.
 forces with transportation to POMCUS and staging area sites, providing
 accommodations for troops, and setting up communications and supply
 lines.8 REFORGER is important militarily because it annually tests U.S. and
 allied ability to carry out the transcontinental reinforcement on which
 NATO's security depends.
 REFORGER's political goals are to promote extended deterrence and foster
 NATO cohesion. The exercise demonstrates to the Soviet Union the West's
 ability to carry out successfully the tasks that would significantly complicate,
 if not neutralize, an East bloc attack. Practicing the reinforcement of Europe
 is a vivid symbol of American solidarity with its European allies. In the post-
 INF (intermediate nuclear forces) Treaty period, with debates over burden-
 sharing and the possibility of unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe,
 many questions have been raised about the continuing viability of extended
 deterrence. REFORGER was instituted in 1968 specifically to meet similar
 concerns when U.S. forces were withdrawn from the continent in response
 to budget constraints and transfers to Vietnam.9 Today, REFORGER is equally
 6. Karl H. Lowe, "U.S. Mobilization for Reinforcing Western Europe," in Jeffrey Simon, ed.,
 NATOlWarsaw Pact Force Mobilization (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1988),
 p. 104.
 7. Host-Nation Support agreements are bilateral treaties between the United States and several
 European allies.
 8. Robert R. Ulin, "Belgium: The Strategic Hub," in Simon, NATO/Warsaw Pact Mobilization,
 pp. 415-417, and p. 424 n. 25. Also see "Host-Nation Support," Soldier, January 1989, p. 44.
 9. David C. Isby and Charles Kamps, Jr., Armies of NATO's Central Front (London: Jane's, 1985),
 pp. 455-456.
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 important as a tangible expression of America's determination to come to the
 defense of Western Europe.
 The United Kingdom also conducts alliance-wide reinforcement exercises
 which serve essentially the same political and military purposes as REFOR-
 GER. In war, the British Army of the Rhine would expand from its current
 55,000 soldiers to some 150,000. In fact, exercise FULL FLOW (part of LION-
 HEART '84) was larger than any REFORGER; it moved 57,700 British troops
 (23,450 by sea; 34,250 by air) to West Germany.10
 NATO NATIONAL EXERCISES. A second category of NATO exercises includes
 those conducted by each country of its armed forces already deployed in
 Europe. These can be distinguished from one another by size: large (50,000
 troops and above), medium (25-50,000), small (13-25,000), and those less
 than 13,000. These size distinctions are based on notification limits estab-
 lished in the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
 Helsinki Accord, which required public announcement of exercises with
 25,000 troops or more, and the 1986 Conference on Confidence- and Security-
 Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) Stockholm Accord
 which, among other provisions, lowered the notification floor to 13,000 sol-
 diers (See Appendix).
 There have been no large single-nation Western exercises in the past ten
 years.11 Those with more than 50,000 troops have all been multinational
 exercises involving at least some troops of a second NATO country. Infre-
 quently the United States12 and France13 have held medium-size national
 exercises in Europe that reach corps size (35,000). One purpose of these
 maneuvers is to test corps-level responsibilities such as command and control
 of several divisions. In addition, military leaders favor multi-division exer-
 cises because they better capture the "fog of war" effect, the confusion and
 chaos that characterize actual combat.14
 The most frequent notifiable Western national exercises are those desig-
 nated "small" (13-25,000 troops) that drill those division-size tasks related to
 command and control, logistics, and intelligence functions that cannot be
 10. Ibid., pp. 303-304.
 11. Since 1975, the only single-nation Western exercise exceeding 50,000 troops was the U.S.
 "REFORGER 75" in 1975.
 12. The U.S. exercises in West Germany are by definition not completely autonomous and there
 is always some sort of interaction with FRG personnel.
 13. France is not a member of NATO's integrated military command.
 14. Author interviews with U.S. Army officers.
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 replicated with fewer troops. In the final category of national exercises (less
 than 13,000), soldiers practice tactics, the essence of combat.15
 NATO MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES. Multinational exercises involve two or
 more nations and have traditionally been run under the authority of national
 military headquarters.16 They can be similarly classified according to size:
 large, medium, small, and those with less than 13,000 troops. NATO holds
 one or two large exercises a year in West Germany. Normally one is linked
 with U.S. troops arriving as part of the reinforcement exercise REFORGER.
 Once these soldiers are in Europe they join U.S. units stationed on the
 continent and other NATO-country forces in field maneuvers. Periodically a
 British contingent will conduct a similar large exercise with troops from other
 Western countries. In 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and
 France held a maneuver of this category in West Germany, which totaled
 some 80,000 troops.17
 Large multinational exercises contribute to several objectives. One is to
 improve cooperation among allied armies that lack common structure, weap-
 ons systems, or equipment. NATO plans to fight with autonomous national
 units of at least brigade size. They would have integrated strategic goals,
 and would support one another in interrelated operations. This might re-
 quire, for example, a German division to allow a British unit on the way to
 the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area) to pass through its position.
 Practicing coordination of formations the size of several divisions can best
 be done through a large exercise. Field training of this type also strengthens
 deterrence by demonstrating that NATO is prepared to fight as a unified
 body.
 Medium and small multinational maneuvers serve essentially the same
 purposes as the large type, except that the training focus is on lower ranks
 of command and levels of organization. In 1987, NATO's multinational ex-
 ercises were primarily of the large and small type, with only a few in the
 medium category. The amount of multinational NATO training with less
 than 13,000 troops is difficult to ascertain from the open literature. Nonethe-
 15. For training soldiers to fight, smaller exercises are desirable; "squadron/company or battal-
 ion/brigade-size exercises are the right framework; it is only at lower command levels that the
 right intensity of activity can be maintained." "Exercise Autumn Forge '84," NATO's Sixteen
 Nations (September/October 1984), p. 107.
 16. A recent exception was CERTAIN STRIKE, the field exercise phase of REFORGER '87, which
 was run by the commander of NATO's Northern Army Group. See Gen. Sir Martin Farndale,
 KCB, "Exercise Reforger 87," The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal, January 1988, p. 11.
 17. "French-German Exercise: FAR From Perfect," The Economist, September 27, 1987, p. 63.
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 less, there appears to be little joint activity in the field at this level, which is
 consistent with NATO's plans to fight primarily as national divisions.
 An additional type of training, which may involve more or less than 13,000
 troops (not necessarily in combat formations), consists of command post
 exercises, meant to test command and control operations by simulating actual
 field maneuvers; thus they require only a limited number of combat troops.
 The purpose of these exercises is to practice conflict management of both
 personnel and equipment. Commanders at various levels are trained to direct
 operations (many of which occur only on paper) while the necessary com-
 munications lines and headquarters facilities are checked out.
 WARSAW PACT TROOP ROTATION. Twice a year the Soviets have rotated their
 conscript troops, primarily by air, from the Soviet Union's three Western
 military districts into the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslo-
 vakia, Poland, and Hungary. The transfer involves some 125,000 troops
 (roughly 25 percent of the 600,000 Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, each
 serving two years), or three times as many as NATO's largest reinforcement
 exercises. The troop rotations are not a reinforcement exercise in the same
 sense as REFORGER. The Soviet soldiers are new recruits; they do not travel
 in formal units or with equipment. They disperse to individual units when
 they arrive, and the entire rotation lasts at least three to four weeks.18
 Nonetheless, the Soviet troop rotation serves some reinforcement exercise
 purposes. In addition to merely rotating troops, these transfers allow the
 Soviet Union to practice airlift procedures. This movement also concerns the
 West because it could be used covertly to increase troop strength. It is
 sometimes difficult to determine quickly if the outgoing troops have actually
 left. Given the relative state of readiness (about 80-85 percent manned) of
 Soviet Category I units in Eastern Europe, this potentially rapid method to
 increase manpower could add to Warsaw Pact capabilities to mount an attack
 by in-place forces with little warning. This is especially true if trained troops
 were brought in instead of new conscripts.
 18. In contrast, REFORGER involves the transport of active duty army personnel, who are in
 structured formations and accompanied by at least some equipment; these troops move to
 concentration points when they land in Europe and do this all in a week's time. According to
 the Stockholm Accord requirements, because REFORGER exercises involve structured units
 which concentrate, they must be notified, while troop rotations do not require notification.
 "Final Act of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament
 in Europe, Stockholm, 19 September 1986," in J.A.S. Grenville and Bernard Wasserstein, eds.,
 The Major International Treaties Since 1945: A History and Guide with Texts (London: Methuen,
 1987), pp. 482-489.
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 WARSAW PACT NATIONAL EXERCISES. Large Warsaw Pact exercises (50,000-
 plus troops) are relatively rare, and only the Soviet Union has held them.19
 These exercises serve two purposes. They contribute to publicly stated Soviet
 goals such as "increasing cooperation between different branches of the
 armed forces,"20 and improvement of command and control. The Soviet
 military places great value on, and frequently practices, procedures for for-
 mulating military operations and transmitting these plans to lower-level
 units.21 A second objective of large Soviet exercises has been to intimidate
 wayward allies or to prepare for intervention in Eastern Europe. This was
 the case in the spring of 1968 before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and
 during the Polish crisis of 1980-81.22
 Medium-size unilateral Soviet exercises (25-50,000 troops) are relatively
 rare and in the past have been close in size to the Helsinki 25,000 notification
 floor (i.e., at the lower end of the 25-50,000 range). Since 1986, when the
 Stockholm Accord reduced the notification floor for exercises to 13,000 troops,
 most Soviet national exercises have been of the small type (13-25,000). Be-
 ginning in 1987, each of the East bloc countries (except Romania) gave notice
 of one national exercise. With the exception of several voluntary notifications
 given by Hungary under the Helsinki Accord, this is the first time that non-
 Soviet East European countries have announced national exercises.
 WARSAW PACT MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES. The large multinational exercises
 of the Warsaw Pact, which are not common (just two since 1981), appear to
 have several aims. The first is cover for preparations related to military
 actions. It is a standard technique of deception to use exercises as a pretext
 for the massing of men and materiel before an attack. Prior to the 1968 Soviet
 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact exercises served as a cover for
 concentrating forces in and around that country.23
 19. The Soviet Union has held three since 1980.
 20. This is a standard description of the objective of exercises given in official notification. See
 for example the stated purpose of the exercise KAVKAZ in 1976 in Stockholm International
 Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 1977: World Armaments and Disarmament (New
 York: Crane Russak, 1977), p. 407; and ZAPAD 81 in SIPRI Yearbook 1982: World Armaments and
 Disarmament (London: Tayler and Francis, 1982), p. 61.
 21. John Erickson, Lynn Hansen, and William Schneider, Soviet Ground Forces: An Operational
 Assessment (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 129-131.
 22. Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore, Md.:
 Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 73; Sidney I. Ploss, Moscow and the Polish Crisis
 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 51.
 23. John M. Caravelli, "Soviet and Joint Warsaw Pact Exercises: Functions and Utility," Armed
 Forces and Society, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring 1983), pp. 411-412. Also see Christopher D. Jones, Soviet
 Influence in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 114-116.
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 If the Pact were planning to attack the West, exercises might be mandatory
 for training conscripts or reserves. Soviet military history writings have
 stressed the important role of exercises in preparing troops before major
 operations in World War 11.24 Soviet conscripts who rotate into Eastern Europe
 are normally green inductees; their basic military training (i.e., "boot camp")
 largely takes place within active military units.25 Many of the Soviet Union's
 reservists might also require refresher training if they end up with an unfa-
 miliar unit or equipment.26
 Even when military intervention has not been the chosen course of action,
 large Warsaw Pact exercises have also provided opportunities for political
 leverage or signaling in crises. During the Berlin crisis of 1961, Soviet troops
 held large-scale exercises in the GDR, and the first-ever combined Warsaw
 Pact maneuvers took place.27 Along with the unilateral Soviet exercises men-
 tioned above, Warsaw Pact maneuvers were also held around Poland during
 its political turmoil in 1980-81.28
 Another central purpose of the East bloc's large, medium, and small multi-
 national exercises is to integrate national military forces within the Soviet
 command structure. Improving command and control is a particularly im-
 portant task at all levels because in wartime the Warsaw Pact and national
 command structures would be absorbed under Soviet authority.29 This inte-
 gration of forces has furthered two traditional Soviet objectives: 1) developing
 a more unified Warsaw Pact army; and 2) restricting the development of
 autonomous national East European military capabilities that might encour-
 age efforts to attain political independence or to turn against Soviet forces.30
 EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES IN MANEUVER SIZE. Several reasons
 account for the differences in the size and types of exercises between East
 24. See, e.g., Col.-General M. Gareyev, "About the Experience of Troop Combat Training,"
 Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 4 (April 1983), pp. 11-20. (Soviet article titles translated by the
 authors.)
 25. The Soviet Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet (DOSAAF)
 military programs in all Soviet secondary schools also contribute to the experience and knowl-
 edge of these new inductees.
 26. Soviet Readiness for War, p. 8.
 27. Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982). See pp. 213, 239.
 28. Jeffrey Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
 Press, 1985), pp. 166-177; also Ploss, Moscow and the Polish Crisis, p. 44.
 29. See Michael Sadykiewicz, The Warsaw Pact Command Structure in Peace and in War, R-3558-
 RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, September 1988).
 30. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, pp. 106-131.
 International Security 14:3 | 76
 and West. NATO emphasizes large exercises, first, because the Atlantic Al-
 liance must practice the massive reinforcement of Europe by sea and air from
 the United States and United Kingdom to offset the Soviets' shorter land
 lines of communication (LOCs), which give the Soviet Union easier access
 to Central Europe. In addition, continental forces (e.g., Belgian and Dutch)
 sometimes must travel hundreds of kilometers to reach General Defense
 Positions (GDPs) as NATO moves to wartime footing. Second, NATO's for-
 ward defense strategy requires shifting large formations flexibly and quickly
 along an extended frontier to reinforce areas of initial attack or attempted
 breakthroughs by the numerically superior East bloc forces.31 Third, NATO
 needs larger exercises because it has more countries to coordinate in combat
 operations. Finally, the West requires larger exercises because it has to cluster
 the bulk of its maneuvers in one or two months in the fall to avoid the crop
 and farmland damage that would occur at other times of the year in the
 densely populated FRG.
 Two explanations can be offered for the Warsaw Pact's primary use of
 medium and small exercises. The traditional offensive strategy of the East
 bloc has been designed to seize the initiative. Tactical flexibility is not as
 important as getting the right forces to the right place in the time required.
 The efficient movement of forces would also be important under the Pact's
 declared new "defensive" doctrine where, it is said, the decisive "counter-
 offensive" will be mounted only after an initial period when defensive op-
 erations dominate.32 In both cases, the Soviet style of warfare makes com-
 mand and control extremely important, and they can be improved through
 smaller exercises, primarily set-piece combination command post exercises
 and field training exercises, which mix actual maneuvers with simulations.33
 A second possible determinant of Soviet exercise patterns, especially today,
 is budgetary constraints. Large exercises are expensive and the Soviet Union
 may believe that it gets more for its resources elsewhere. There is some
 evidence that suggests that relative to NATO and the United States, the
 Soviet Union puts less of its money into training. For example, Soviet tank
 31. See Senator Carl Levin, Beyond the Bean Count: Realistically Assessing the Conventional Military
 Balance in Europe, Report of the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcom-
 mittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, 2nd ed., July 1988, pp. 6-14.
 32. See Jeffrey W. Legro, "The Military Meaning of the New Soviet Doctrine," Parameters, Vol.
 19, No. 4 (forthcoming, December 1989).
 33. Roland Flor, "Major Exercises of NATO and Warsaw Pact Land Forces in Europe, 1984-A
 Comparative Analysis," Defense Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1986), pp. 191-193.
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 gunners fire one-tenth the number of live rounds that U.S. gunners do.34
 Soviet fighter pilots fly about one-half as much as NATO pilots.35
 OTHER DIMENSIONS OF MILITARY EXERCISES
 The dimensions of the military exercises of the two alliances can be compared
 in terms of their number, duration, location, timing and operational elements.
 NUMBER. During the Helsinki CSBM agreement (1975-86), NATO gave
 notice of more exercises than did the East bloc. This, however, may simply
 reflect the fact that the Western alliance voluntarily included a greater number
 of small exercises in its public plans than did the Warsaw Pact: 36 of NATO's
 69 announced exercises, and 4 of the Warsaw Pact's 28 declared exercises,
 were small (i.e., below 25,000 troops).36
 Under the more recent Stockholm Accord 13,000 notification limit, how-
 ever, the Warsaw Pact held 36 announced exercises in 1987 and 1988, while
 NATO's total was 30. The large increase in the number of Warsaw Pact
 notifications with the drop in the notifiable limit from 25,000 to 13,000 may
 suggest that many more Eastern exercises under the 25,000 Helsinki notifi-
 cation threshold were held in the 1975-86 period than were announced. It
 may also be the case that the Soviets have intentionally inflated the number
 of exercises notified in the past two years, for the political purpose of touting
 the "new thinking" in Soviet attitudes towards compliance.38 What remains
 unclear is how many Pact exercises are now being held below the 13,000
 notification floor. The size of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact division is under 13,000
 troops (11,500-12,500); thus, maneuvers at the division level can be con-
 ducted without public announcement.
 DURATION. Most NATO and Warsaw Pact exercises tend to run from four
 to twelve days.39 Several times a year, however, NATO holds exercises that
 34. David Evans, "Ill-Fed Strangers Without Maps-The Soviet Military," The Chicago Tribune,
 November 27, 1987, p. 19, as cited in Levin, Beyond the Bean Count, p. 49.
 35. Rick Maze, "Soviets Get What They Pay for in Soldiers," Army Times, September 17, 1984,
 p. 7, as cited in Levin, Beyond the Bean Count, p. 49.
 36. "Tables of Notification of Military Maneuvers Made Under Provisions of CSCE Final Act
 During the Period 1975-1985," Memorandum, John Gunderson to all Delegation Members, U.S.
 Delegation, Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in
 Europe, Stockholm, Sweden, June 23, 1986.
 37. Based on the notification schedule in the SIPRI Yearbook 1987: World Armaments and Disar-
 mament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 371-381; and SIPRI Yearbook 1988: World
 Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 338-346.
 38. U.S. government officials have claimed to have seen some evidence that unrelated Pact
 military activities have been grouped together so that they are large enough to be notified.
 39. Duration averages hold true across size categories.
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 last longer, sometimes up to a month or more. Historically, those rare Warsaw
 Pact exercises that have gone beyond twelve days have coincided with po-
 litical turmoil or Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. This was the case in
 Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980-81.
 LOCATION. The public data on the locations of NATO and Warsaw Pact
 exercises is sketchy and permits only a few broad generalizations. On the
 Western side, troops train on the territory they expect to fight on, primarily
 along the inter-German and FRG-Czechoslovakia borders, with a few exer-
 cises in northern Norway and Turkish Thrace. Warsaw Pact country exercises
 have most frequently been held in the northern and central parts of the GDR,
 the north and northwestern regions of Czechoslovakia, the western areas of
 Hungary, and the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union.40 The po-
 litical situation has often shaped which of the East European countries held
 the most exercises in any particular year. The Czech and Polish crises seem
 to have influenced the location of exercises in the corresponding time peri-
 ods.41
 The East does not appear to train in forward areas as frequently as NATO.
 There are several possible reasons for this pattern. One is that the terrain
 along the eastern side of the border is not well suited for exercises. A second
 explanation relates to the Pact's traditional offensive strategy. Eastern forces
 are less dependent on knowledge and preparation of their own terrain,
 as they expect to fight in Western Europe. It is unlikely that the Soviet-
 dominated Eastern alliance is committed to an operational strategy of for-
 ward defense if initially forced on the defensive. If history serves as a prec-
 edent, the Soviet Union would trade space for time in order to establish an
 effective defense.
 TIMING. Another characteristic difference between the military exercises of
 the two blocs is in their timing. Although the annual REFORGER exercise
 and several ground maneuvers are infrequently held in the winter, NATO
 conducts the bulk of its maneuvers in September and October in the annual
 "AUTUMN FORGE" series. Of the 37 notified NATO exercises held in West
 Germany from 1980-88, only three-CERTAIN GUARDIAN (January 1985),
 CERTAIN SENTINEL (January 1986), and CARAVAN GUARD (February
 1988)-have been held outside of the usual September-October field exercise
 40. Flor, "Major Exercises of NATO," pp. 195-196.
 41. See Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces, pp. 37, 44, 69, 177, 188.
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 period. Warsaw Pact exercises tend to be evenly spaced throughout the year,
 with a gap sometimes in the late November-January period.
 OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS. The operational character of the two blocs' exer-
 cises is also different. The Warsaw Pact's combination command post/field
 training exercises involve movement of units in a rigid, sequential fashion at
 the tactical level (i.e., division-level and below). As a Soviet defector has
 described the choreography, Soviet soldiers walk through the exercise before
 they actually carry it out with weapons.42 The troops taking part have pre-
 set times to fulfill designated movements at pre-arranged locations.43 These
 exercises clearly emphasize tight high-level command and control over flex-
 ibility and initiative in the field.
 This does not, however, mean that the Red Army's actions would be
 predictable or rigid. Surprise and initiative are key principles of Soviet mili-
 tary art. Furthermore, in the Soviet system, flexibility is emphasized at the
 strategic and operational levels (such as switching units rapidly between
 different salients). In World War II, Soviet competence at the operational-
 strategic scale overwhelmed German forces that had superior tactical skills.44
 There are, of course, drawbacks to the Soviet method. Military writings
 recognize that the formalism of training is a problem because the modern
 battlefield will demand better leadership skills (creativity, flexibility, initiative)
 from lower-level commanders.45
 The traditional (i.e., pre-Gorbachev) scenario practiced in Eastern exercises
 begins with an enemy attack which achieves limited tactical success. The
 enemy offensive is soon contained as Pact forces regroup and are reinforced.
 But defense is considered only a transitory stage, and the Eastern side then
 undertakes counteroffensives which ultimately destroy the attacker. Any lost
 territory is regained and sometimes the exercises signal the intention to
 mount a deep offensive into enemy territory. Pact maneuvers focus on com-
 mand and control, fast long-range attacks by armored units with the support
 42. Viktor Suvorov, The "Liberators": My Lift in the Soviet Army (New York: Berkeley Books,
 1981), pp. 90-93.
 43. Also see Levin, Beyond the Bean Count, pp. 49-50.
 44. Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (London: Jane's
 Information Group, 1988), p. 85.
 45. "New Quality Military Education," Krasnaia zvezda, January 27, 1989, p. 1; and interview
 with Army General B.V. Snetkov, Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,
 "Military Training: Parameters of Quality," Voennyi vestnik, June 1989, pp. 3-7.
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 of air forces, and rapid water crossings with the aid of airborne and heliborne
 troops.46
 As indicated above, one apparent omission in Soviet training is the scarcity
 of large exercises that undertake the massive logistical tasks necessary for an
 invasion. The Soviet Union does test some airlift capacity with the semi-
 annual rotation of troops into East Europe, but the more difficult task of
 moving large amounts of equipment to support troops in the field is rarely
 exercised.47 A number of explanations might account for this pattern. First,
 the Warsaw Pact's land lines of communications provide a comparative lo-
 gistical advantage over the sea lines of the United States to the Central Front,
 and thus reinforcement training does not require as much attention. Fur-
 thermore, the Soviets have traditionally maintained significant stocks of
 forward-based equipment and supplies, which would lessen logistical de-
 mands in at least the first phase of a war.48 For example, the East could
 throw new units into battle when others wear down, while Western plans
 to reconstitute partially destroyed formations put greater stress on logistics.
 Nonetheless, before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union
 felt it necessary to carry out a massive logistical exercise, "NEMAN," which
 involved calling up reservists, mobilizing civilian resources, and deploying
 Soviet troops in the USSR and across Poland, along with the materiel needed
 to sustain them.49 The Soviet reduction of forces in Eastern Europe under
 Gorbachev may mean that logistical tasks will be even more important in the
 future as more men and materiel would have to be moved forward in a
 conflict.
 The operational elements of NATO's exercises contrast with those of the
 Warsaw Pact in terms of style, scenarios, and emphases. In terms of style,
 the NATO leadership establishes general operational level objectives and
 then permits a good deal of free play. Aspects of Western exercises are also
 staged, but relative to Eastern maneuvers, NATO's are less scripted and
 allow for greater initiative on the part of leaders of all ranks. This flexibility
 is an important part of the Western alliance's forward defense, which must
 respond rapidly to Soviet force concentrations and breakthrough attempts.
 46. Flor, "Major Exercises of NATO," p. 200.
 47. One important case is "NEMAN," the large logistical exercise that preceded the 1968 invasion
 of Czechoslovakia.
 48. David C. Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (London: Jane's, 1988), p. 93.
 49. Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces, pp. 49-50.
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 The scenarios that guide NATO exercises are in principle similar to those of
 the Eastern alliance, although Western forces traditionally do not simulate a
 significant counteroffensive, but only regain the territory that has been lost.
 Overall, the tasks emphasized in Western exercises are dominated by the
 logistical demands of bringing troops into Europe and moving them up to
 the front line.
 CHANGE IN EXERCISE PATTERNS?
 Today both NATO and the Warsaw Pact appear to be modifying their military
 exercises, and it is important to consider the sources and possible future
 direction of this evolution. NATO is moving towards holding smaller and
 less frequent exercises in Central Europe. Two considerations explain this
 development.
 First, West German resentment towards the disturbances that exercises
 cause has crystallized in the wake of several recent events. The turning point
 was the August 1988 crash of an Italian aerobatics team at the Ramstein
 airshow where twenty-one spectators-mostly West German-were killed.
 Sensitivities aroused by this event were heightened by three lengthy ground
 exercises conducted in the same region that fall.51 In December, 1988, a U.S.
 A-10 plane crashed in the German city of Ramscheid killing five people and
 injuring dozens more. This led to a quick decision by the United States,
 Britain, Canada, and West Germany to halt low-level aircraft training for
 three weeks.52
 Second, Gorbachev's "new thinking" has contributed to a perception that
 the Soviet military threat to Europe is declining.53 Soviet representatives have
 trumpeted the Soviet Union's new foreign policy themes of interdependence
 and mutual security backed up by a new "defensive" Warsaw Pact military
 doctrine. In December 1988, Gorbachev's force reduction pledge at the United
 Nations added weight to the Soviet declaratory position.54 West Germans in
 50. Flor, "Major Exercises of NATO," p. 200.
 51. "Not Much Room for Manoeuvre," The Economist, December 10, 1988, p. 58.
 52. "Low-Level Jet Training Halted in W. Germany," Washington Post, December 13, 1988,
 p. All.
 53. "The Gorbachev Effect," The Economist, February 17, 1988, p. 38.
 54. A clarification of Gorbachev's United Nations speech, in an article by Defense Minister
 Yazov, indicates that Soviet forces in Eastern Europe will be reduced by 50,000 men and 5,300
 tanks, and Eastern European countries' forces by another 56,000 men and 1,900 tanks; and that
 the Soviet Union will further decrease its forces in the Western military districts by 190,000 men
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 particular have begun to wonder why allied military maneuvers and move-
 ments, and the disruptions they cause, cannot be curtailed in light of im-
 proved East-West relations.55
 These developments have led Western governments to reassess NATO
 training practices. The West German army has already announced that it is
 planning to reduce significantly the number of its exercises held at the brigade
 level (5,000 men) or above, from twenty-one in 1987 to less than ten in 1990.56
 General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), has
 expressed doubt about the military effectiveness and the economic efficiency
 of large maneuvers.57 And most recently, Pentagon officials have announced
 that the size of REFORGER will be reduced and the scope of ground maneu-
 vers in Europe scaled back. REFORGER 89, originally scheduled for Septem-
 ber 1989, will be merged with REFORGER 90, which will take place sometime
 between January and March 1990.58
 While the number and size of exercises may decrease, the United States
 hopes to maintain its capabilities by "training smarter." Under the "REFOR-
 GER Enhancement Program," a new type of exercise known as a "CFX" is
 being developed, which is a combination command post-field training ex-
 ercise that is further enhanced by use of computer simulation. The exercise
 reduces the overall number of men by simulating the battalion-level forces
 (which are trained more effectively in separate smaller exercises), while larger
 formations are simulated through putting more "flags" (division headquar-
 ters) into the field at one time. Thus, NATO can still run large exercises with
 less damage and disturbance to the FRG and its populace.59 This is, of course,
 not a cost-free change. Much of the stress on logistical organizations and
 procedures (and ultimately commanders) will be difficult to recreate without
 the participation of actual soldiers who must be moved, sheltered, and fed.
 and 4,860 tanks. In addition, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries will cut 9,130
 artillery systems and 430 combat aircraft from the territories of the Western military districts to
 the West German border. See Army General D.T. Yazov, "Based on Principles of Realism and
 a Balance of Interests," Pravda, February 9, 1989, p. 4.
 55. Robert J. McCartney, "Allied Army Maneuvers Irk Germans," Washington Post, January 2,
 1989, p. Al.
 56. See David Marsh and David White, "Bundeswehr Plans to Hold Fewer Big Manoeuvres,"
 Financial Times, December 2, 1988, p. 4. (Clarification on the size of the maneuvers subject to
 reduction was provided by the FRG Embassy in Washington, D.C.)
 57. Transcript of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General John Galvin's Remarks
 to the Dutch Atlantic Committee, Dortrecht, The Netherlands, December 6, 1988.
 58. "U.S. to Cut Back Major Exercises in Europe," Boston Globe, February 2, 1989, p. 4.
 59. Interviews with military officers at the J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) and J-7 (Operational
 Plans and Interoperability) branches of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 1989.
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 Eastern maneuvers also may change in the future because of Gorbachev's
 "new thinking" concerning military affairs.60 Gorbachev's December 1988
 United Nations speech stressed that, along with troop and weapon reduc-
 tions, Soviet forces in Europe would be restructured to become "clearly
 defensive."'61 Soviet Defense Minister D. Yazov has noted in his writings and
 speeches that Soviet military policy will now emphasize quality instead of
 quantity, including the need for better training.62
 Although it is uncertain whether these developments will actually lead to
 a more "defensive" Warsaw Pact strategy and force structure, they could
 affect Eastern exercises in several respects. Both General Yazov and Marshal
 Sergei Akhromeyev, former chief of the Soviet General Staff, have directed
 Western attention to Soviet and Warsaw Pact exercises, which they say will
 increasingly reveal a more defensive orientation.63 Exactly what this means
 is unclear, but Soviet writings indicate that more time will be devoted to
 training for defensive operations.64 Marshal Akhromeyev, during his visit to
 the United States in the summer of 1988, claimed that the Red Army now
 plans to remain on the defensive for three weeks at the beginning of a war,
 a revision which will supposedly be reflected in Soviet exercises.65
 Reports from Western observers of Pact maneuvers have mostly been
 skeptical regarding the degree of the shift towards defensive operations. In
 the fall of 1988, observers were not shown any maneuvers which included
 defensive actions, with the exception of watching one fortified position over-
 run against little resistance.66 In April of 1989, observers saw no new strides
 60. See Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking
 on Security," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 124-163.
 61. "Excerpts from Speech to U.N. on Major Soviet Military Cuts," New York Times, December
 8, 1988.
 62. Army General D.T. Yazov, "The Qualitative Parameters of Defense Building," Krasnaia
 zvezda, August 9, 1988, pp. 1-2.
 63. See Michael Gordon, "U.S. and Soviets to Seek Ways to Avoid Fighting by Mistake," New
 York Times, July 12, 1988, p. A12; George Wilson, "Nicaragua Intrudes as Carlucci-Yazov Topic,"
 Washington Post, March 18, 1988, p. A18.
 64. One Soviet article indicates that up to 50 percent of total training time will be dedicated to
 defensive operations. Colonel G. Miranovich and Colonel V. Shitarenko, "How is Defense
 Strong? The Organizers of the Model Lesson Tried to Answer the Question," Krasnaia zvezda,
 December 10, 1987, p. 2.
 65. See William Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Winter 1988-
 89), p. 130.
 66. Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet Maneuvers: A New Strategy?" New York Times, November 4,
 1988, p. A8. Also see "The Soviets Practiced only Attack Type of Combat," Die Welt, November
 12-13, 1988, p. 4, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report:
 Western Europe, November 16, p. 11.
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 in offensive potential, but questioned the supposed defensive nature of the
 maneuver, as the defenders had not hidden their tanks well and had no
 anti-air guns.67 Not all accounts, however are pessimistic. Admiral William
 Crowe, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported seeing military
 exercises and wargames that were "truly defensive" during his June 1989
 visit to the Soviet Union.68 Two explanations might account for these differing
 reports. Some Warsaw Pact officers had claimed that it would take time to
 implement the concrete changes implied by the new doctrine, and Crowe's
 report might be evidence that this is now occurring.69 However, the differing
 accounts may simply reflect the difficulty in determining whether offense or
 defense is the actual focus of the exercise.
 In addition to scenarios practiced, the number of Warsaw Pact exercises
 also could change. The chief of the General Staff, Army General Moiseyev,
 has declared that the defensive doctrine has led to a reduction in the number
 of major exercises. Yet it is not clear that the overall quantity of training will
 decline. Moiseyev notes that more time will be devoted to the "qualitative
 training" of smaller units.70 Thus, "public" exercises-those that must be
 notified under the Stockholm Accord-may decline, while training below the
 13,000 troop level increases.71
 Even after the force cuts announced by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw
 Pact countries are implemented, Eastern military maneuvers and movements
 will demand the West's attention because the Warsaw Pact will continue to
 have an advantage in important major ground systems (e.g., artillery) in
 Central Europe and, more importantly, the capability to reinforce forward
 areas relatively quickly from reserves in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area.72 If
 67. George C. Wilson, "Westerners Fault Soviet War Game: Observers Detect No Shift to
 Defensive Doctrine in Mock Battle," Washington Post, April 20, 1989, p. A36.
 68. Interview on "Good Morning America," June 21, 1989, as reported in Current News, June
 23, 1989, p. A2. Also see Michael Dobbs, "Joint Chiefs View Soviet Weaponry," Washington Post,
 April 19, pp. Al and A23.
 69. See Trainor, "Soviet Maneuvers."
 70. "From Defensive Doctrine Positions," Krasnaia zvezda, February 10, 1989, pp. 1-2.
 71. The Soviet Union has announced plans to cut the size of some exercises in East Europe
 scheduled for the fall of 1989 to 13,000 or less troops, supposedly because of the force reductions
 and restructuring in that area. See "Fall Exercises to Reflect Troop Reductions," Moscow TASS
 in English, July 22, 1989; in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, July 24, 1989, pp. 117-118.
 72. This conclusion is based on a balance derived from subtracting the cuts announced by
 Warsaw Pact countries (see Yazov, "Based on Principles of Realism") from figures given in IISS,
 The Military Balance, 1987-88 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1987).
 See also Phillip Karber's figures in "The Impact of Gorbachev's Reduction Plan," Armed Forces
 Journal International, January 1989, pp. 54-64.
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 the quantity and quality of Warsaw Pact training and exercises were increased
 without further reductions in manpower and weapons, NATO's advantages
 in readiness and quality of personnel might be reduced, detracting from the
 West's security.
 The Purposes and Content of Proposals to Constrain Military Exercises
 The ideal purpose of constraining military exercises is to diminish the capa-
 bility of large concentrations of ready military forces to attack rapidly and
 defeat the other side. Limiting the dimensions of exercises could provide for
 greater confidence that: 1) an attack is not being planned; 2) the other side
 has less potential to execute it; and 3) the defender will have a better chance
 to react and repel it.
 Especially in a crisis, exercises could raise anxieties that military action is
 imminent, setting off a chain of events that could lead to war. The mobili-
 zation and counter-mobilization at the start of World War I are often cited as
 an example of this phenomenon.73 Proposals to constrain exercises can also
 serve political purposes. For example, the West would like to dissuade the
 Soviet Union from pressuring or intervening in Eastern Europe. The Soviets,
 on the other hand, are interested in inhibiting the Atlantic Alliance's cohesion
 by limiting U.S. military involvement in Europe. Western and Eastern official
 proposals reflect these different concerns about the exercises of the other
 side.
 NATO PROPOSALS
 The United States has traditionally been wary of constraining maneuvers,
 fearing that such measures would harm NATO's relative position. For ex-
 ample, proposals to create zones along borders where military maneuvers
 are prohibited would impair NATO's policy of forward defense more than it
 would hinder the Warsaw Pact's offensive strategy. The United States has
 also been concerned that constraints on exercises would slow a NATO de-
 fensive response to aggression because the West would be hesitant to react
 to ambiguous warning by violating treaty provisions.74 American proposals
 73. This is the interpretation presented by Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the First World War (New
 York: Macmillan, 1928). Disagreeing that the cause of World War I was inadvertence is Fritz
 Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1967).
 74. John Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Confer-
 ence (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), pp. 12-13, 58.
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 have therefore focused, not on constraints, but instead on measures that
 provide for greater openness and transparency, such as notification and
 inspection of military exercises and activities.75 The stated purposes of these
 U.S. proposals are: to reduce the risks of surprise attack and of conflict which
 results from misunderstanding, and to lessen the threat of force for political
 intimidation.76
 Most Western nations on the whole share U.S. concerns about exercise
 constraints. NATO did consider limiting the number of divisions out of
 garrison as part of the "Associated Measures" which accompanied its Decem-
 ber 1979 proposal at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR).
 Ultimately, however, the proposal was shelved because of concerns on the
 part of FRG and NATO military authorities that it would hamper an effective
 Western defense by restricting the large-scale exercise of overseas reinforce-
 ment (e.g., REFORGER) and the movement of troops from garrisons to
 forward defense positions.77
 WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS
 Until recently, the Soviet Union has also been slow to promote constraint
 measures, apparently because it has been equally hesitant to accept limita-
 tions on its military activities.78 The exception to this record has been the
 Soviet proposal, first offered in 1979, to prohibit exercises with more than
 40-50,000 troops.79 This constraint appears to be aimed at limiting NATO's
 large maneuvers (two or three a year), which are more frequent than the
 Pact's (five since 1980). Yet it would also theoretically constrain the large
 Warsaw Pact exercises that have been used for military intervention or polit-
 ical leverage over Eastern European countries (assuming the limits could not
 be circumvented via a number of simultaneous small exercises). One should
 note, however, that the Soviet Union ignored Helsinki notification require-
 ments during the 1980-81 Polish crisis.80 In June 1986, the Soviet Union
 75. Ibid., p. 37.
 76. See proposal SC.1, which the U.S. co-authored at the Stockholm CDE on January 24, 1984,
 reproduced in Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, p. 167.
 77. Lothar Ruehl, MBFR: Lessons and Problems, Adelphi Paper No. 176 (London: IISS, 1982),
 pp. 26-27; Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, pp. 23, 58.
 78. Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, pp. 13, 18-19, 58-59.
 79. Brezhnev made the first proposal in 1979; see SIPRI Yearbook 1980: World Armaments and
 Disarmament, p. 498. The offer was repeated at the 1986 Stockholm CDE; see Borawski, From the
 Atlantic to the Urals, p. 58.
 80. Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces, pp. 169, 174.
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 offered to modify its size constraint proposal by allowing one exercise with
 over 40,000 troops every third year, but NATO remained uninterested.
 The provisions of recent Soviet and Warsaw Pact proposals, however, are
 explicitly aimed at constraining military exercises. The meeting of the Warsaw
 Pact's Political Consultative Committee on July 15 and 16, 1988, produced a
 statement advocating zones of weapons reduction in Central Europe, which
 would be accompanied by measures limiting many of the dimensions of
 military exercises including size, number, duration, and location.81 On Oc-
 tober 28, 1988, the Foreign Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Pact advo-
 cated restrictions, independent of other measures, on the scope and number
 of simultaneous exercises, the duration of exercises, movements of troops
 and equipment, and military activities close to the borders of other coun-
 tries.82
 On March 9, 1989, at the Vienna Negotiations on CSBMs, four Eastern
 European countries (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria)
 followed up on the October Warsaw Pact Ministers Committee meeting by
 proposing specific CSBMs related to the size, timing, number, and duration
 of military activities (exercises, transfers, and concentration of troops and
 equipment) in Europe. A size limit of 40,000 troops (also including alerts) is
 advocated. These countries would further limit any series of exercises taking
 place in close proximity to one another to not more than 40,000 troops each.
 The timing of exercises would be constrained to no more than three activities
 (as defined by current notification limits) held simultaneously on the territory
 of each participating state, with the total not exceeding 40,000 troops. The
 number of exercises with more than 25,000 troops would be restricted to no
 more than two per year for each participating state. Finally, these East bloc
 countries want military activities requiring prior notification to be limited to
 a duration not exceeding 15 days.83
 The motivation for the East's new interest in these constraints is not
 entirely clear. Certainly one reason is to contribute to the Soviet campaign
 to influence Western perceptions of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact military threat
 81. "Warsaw Pact States' Statement on Talks on Armed Forces and Conventional Arms Reduc-
 tion in Europe," Pravda, July 16, 1988, pp. 1, 2.
 82. "Statement on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe,"
 issued by the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' Committee in Budapest, Pravda, October 29, 1988,
 p. 4.
 83. The full text of the proposal can be found in Arms Control Reporter, May 1989, pp. 402.D.61-
 64.
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 and to demonstrate the Soviet Union's new attitude on security issues. It is
 also conceivable that, in light of the East's announced unilateral reductions,
 the concentration of NATO troops for exercises in the FRG within the months
 of September and October each year might be of more concern to the Warsaw
 Pact.
 There are also pragmatic military purposes behind these suggested con-
 straints. As clarified below, many of them favor the Warsaw Pact's military
 position and training patterns at the expense of NATO's. These proposals
 are also aimed at taking advantage of West German domestic opposition to
 exercises. The East's suggested limits on the size, number, and duration of
 maneuvers within each country, rather than on a bloc-to-bloc basis, certainly
 recognizes that most of NATO's exercises take place in West Germany, while
 the Pact's are divided among the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hun-
 gary.
 Another proposal by an Eastern country at the Stockholm CDE talks would
 limit the location of exercises. Rumania, concerned with the potential Soviet
 use of force against itself as well as with East-West conflict, has called for
 zones along borders in which there would be no maneuvers, military move-
 ments, or concentrations of armed forces and armaments.84
 Finally, a measure that might be used to limit exercises is a restriction on
 the type of activities practiced. The Soviet Union's new focus on defensive
 operations suggests the possibility that if a way could be found to prohibit
 offensive maneuvers, the ability to attack would be diminished, and the
 defender's position strengthened.
 The Relative Merits of Constraints versus Flexibility in Military Exercises
 The key issue for the West is whether exercise constraints would contribute
 to NATO's security by limiting the possibility of a successful Warsaw Pact
 attack more than they would inhibit NATO's ability to prepare for and re-
 spond to such an invasion. This calculation requires an assessment of how
 specific constraints would affect:
 1) Detecting preparations for a Warsaw Pact attack: Would the constraint
 enhance the chances that Western intelligence would discover military
 preparations for either a short-warning or extended mobilization attack?
 84. Rumanian proposal (SC.2), published in Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, pp. 41-43
 and 167-169.
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 Would it limit the possibility that the East would be able to use exercises
 as cover for an invasion?
 2) Decision-making effectiveness within the Alliance: Would it contribute to
 a timely NATO decision on the use of force?
 3) Defending West Germany successfully: Does it protect NATO's required
 exercise patterns and its training needs? Would it avoid inhibitions on
 the ability of Western forces to respond to warning?
 4) Diminishing Eastern ability to attack: Would it limit the Warsaw Pact's
 training patterns and preparations necessary to support an offensive
 strategy?
 An additional criterion by which Western analysts have traditionally
 judged exercise constraint measures is their effect on the costs of Soviet
 intervention in, and military intimidation of, Eastern Europe. The past record
 of the Soviet military activities concerning East bloc countries (e.g., Hungary,
 Czechoslovakia and Poland) indicates that certain proposed constraints such
 as size, duration, and location would have to be violated if the Soviet re-
 sponse to new crises were to be intervention. Such an obvious Soviet breach
 of an international treaty might increase the likelihood of a united Western
 response and the magnitude of any resulting sanctions. Thus some types of
 constraints on exercises might raise the costs of Soviet intervention. Yet given
 the history of tepid Western responses to such invasions in the past, these
 additional costs are likely to be minimal. During the Czech crisis, NATO not
 only did not respond to indications of an intervention, but in fact a West
 German exercise was relocated away from the border to avoid "provocation."
 In short, Western countries are unlikely to alter their response because a
 CSBM is technically broken when NATO security is not directly threatened.
 This consideration, therefore, is of secondary importance to the four outlined
 above, and is not addressed below.
 The criteria of detection, decision-making, defense and diminution can be used
 to assess how Eastern proposals for constraints affecting the size, number,
 timing, duration, and location of exercises would affect the likelihood of
 success of two types of Warsaw Pact attacks against the West.85 The first is
 a short-warning attack, where the Soviet Union would attempt to prepare
 and deploy ready and near-ready forces under the cover of exercises. The
 second is a mobilized attack, where exercises would be used to bring Cate-
 gory II and III troops up to acceptable readiness or move them forward before
 85. The Warsaw Pact proposal did not include a constraint on activities, but because of the
 attention it has received recently, such a constraint is also examined below.
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 the onset of hostilities.86 A significant Soviet jump in mobilization could be
 as deleterious to NATO security as a surprise standing-start Warsaw Pact
 attack, particularly in light of Gorbachev's force reductions.87 The two scen-
 arios are addressed separately only when the effect of the constraints is
 different for each. Although the proposals examined are specific ones, they
 reflect the costs and benefits to the West of their general categories of con-
 straints on ground exercises.88
 LIMIT SIZE
 The East Bloc's proposal to prohibit exercises with more than 40,000 troops
 has mixed effects on the four criteria. First, detection: In terms of NATO's
 ability to foresee Eastern surprise attack preparations, a size constraint would
 marginally help the West by allowing intelligence analysts to differentiate
 activities needed for an exercise (e.g., supply stockpiling) from those required
 for an invasion. The larger the exercise, the more troops and materiel would
 be gathered to conduct it, and the more difficult it would be to distinguish
 from actual preparations. It is generally recognized that NATO intelligence
 means would provide detection of significant East bloc war preparations.89
 Thus the 40,000 limit would merely provide a clearer line for judging inten-
 tions related to military preparations for attack. It would, however, be only
 one of many indicators used to assess the likelihood of an invasion. A size
 constraint would not significantly benefit detection of a mobilized attack, in
 that the training and exercises needed to bring Category II and III troops up
 to speed would primarily take place below a 40,000-troop limit.90
 86. Soviet divisions are maintained at three states of readiness. Category I troops are fully
 deployed formations (85 percent manned) which can go to war in a matter of hours. Category
 II divisions have 100 percent of their equipment but only 50-75 percent of their manpower and
 would take several days to one month to mobilize and become operational. Category III for-
 mations have most of their equipment, although it is older, but are only 15-30 percent manned
 and would take two months and upward to prepare for combat. For a discussion of Categories
 I, II, III (also referred to as A, B, and C), see The Military Balance, 1987-88 (London: IISS, 1987),
 p. 34.
 87. See James A. Thomson, An Unfavorable Situation: NATO and the Conventional Balance, N-2842-
 FF/RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, November 1988), esp. pp. 30-33.
 88. This analysis is based on exercise patterns, force structure, and strategies as they appear at
 the present time. Change is of course apparent in these areas, yet its future form and direction
 remain vague.
 89. James Blaker, "Transparency, Inspections, and Surprise Attack," in S. Windass and E. Grove,
 eds., Cooperative Security (Adderbury, U.K.: Foundation for International Security, 1987), pp. 1-
 25.
 90. Donnelly, Red Banner, p. 159, describes how a Category III unit doing a practice mobilization
 spent two weeks training at the company and battalion level and ten days in a regimental
 exercise.
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 One of the main problems for NATO decision-making is responding in a
 timely fashion to a threat of a Warsaw Pact attack. Western officials, con-
 cerned with their domestic political standing or a desire to avoid conflict,
 might be disinclined to approve a disruptive mobilization. And officials are
 aware that such an act under certain circumstances could fuel the intensity
 of a crisis, contributing to the onset of conflict (as in World War I). A
 constraint on the size of exercises would enhance decision-making, by pro-
 viding a means of judging intentions. Leaders who might otherwise wish to
 delay initiating military counter-preparations would have better information
 to convince both themselves and their publics that speedy action was nec-
 essary.
 Several counter-arguments to this conclusion should be considered. First,
 a size constraint might be circumvented by holding many exercises below
 the 40,000 limit. Yet such activity in itself would be an indication of potential
 trouble. It might also be argued that a limit on the size of exercises would
 work to the disadvantage of NATO decision-making, since Western societies
 are more likely than Eastern ones to feel restrained by the "legal" limits of a
 size restriction. If warning were at all ambiguous, some maintain that NATO
 officials would be less likely to take the necessary preparatory measures
 because this would break the treaty "law." Nonetheless, intelligence means
 should be able to ascertain if such a constraint were being violated by the
 Pact. Given, then, that the ambiguity of a treaty violation would be minimal,
 this argument against a restraint is not very powerful.
 A 40,000-troop limit would marginally hamper the West's defense capability.
 NATO relies on intensive training to maintain the readiness and reinforce-
 ment capacity to sustain a credible forward defense. Under a 40,000-troop
 limit, the Western alliance would have to reduce the size of its larger exercises
 that occur in the fall, particularly the field exercise in which forces arriving
 as part of REFORGER join allied troops already in Europe. In REFORGER
 1987 (the largest ever), 35,000 troops were deployed from the continental
 United States to Europe. Once there, the troops combined with other allied
 forces in the exercise CERTAIN STRIKE, involving a total of 78,000 soldiers.91
 This constraint would have prohibited the participation of the 35,000 RE-
 FORGER forces in that field maneuver. The result of such a limitation might
 91. Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Countering Soviet Encirclement Operations: Emerging NATO Con-
 cepts," International Defense Review (November 1988), pp. 1417-1418.
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 therefore be a reduction in NATO capability to integrate large reinforcements
 from the United States into the defense of Europe.
 Two developments, however, make constraints on training in large num-
 bers less damaging for NATO in the future. The first is that the West is
 unilaterally reducing the size of its exercises. The second is that new types
 of exercises are being developed that make use of computer technology to
 simulate large combat operations while using relatively few troops. SACEUR
 General Galvin argues that this will allow the West to "train smarter." Fur-
 thermore, it may give NATO a comparative advantage because its computer
 and software technology is ahead of the East's.92
 In terms of diminishing Warsaw Pact capabilities by limiting training for
 offensive operations, a size constraint would have only a minor effect. The
 East is less dependent than the West in peacetime on maneuvers of more
 than 40,000 troops: thus it would be able to meet most of its training needs
 within the boundaries of this measure.
 In sum, t-here is a close trade-off between what NATO would gain and
 what it would lose under this restriction on size. It would benefit the West
 because it enhances detection and decision-making. Its main drawback is
 that it would restrict traditional NATO training, especially large field exercises
 involving European forces, the U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR), and U.S.
 soldiers arriving as part of REFORGER. Nonetheless, the Western Alliance
 would still be able to conduct REFORGER and field maneuvers with corps-
 size formations. And given that NATO has both the need and the technology
 to move to less manpower-intensive exercises, some type of size constraint
 (not necessarily 40,000) could benefit NATO security.
 LIMIT NUMBER
 The Warsaw Pact proposes to limit the number of medium-size exercises (25-
 50,000) to no more than two on the territory of each participating state per
 year. In terms of detection and decision-making, the impact of this measure is
 essentially the same as that of a size constraint; both would benefit from
 having a firm standard by which to judge Warsaw Pact intentions.
 This constraint would, however, be detrimental in terms of NATO's ability
 to use exercises in preparing an adequate defense. NATO holds several exer-
 cises each year with over 25,000 soldiers. Furthermore, these maneuvers all
 92. General Galvin made this point in a presentation at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of
 Government, March 13, 1989.
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 take place in West Germany because, as the only Allied state on the NATO-
 WTO central border, that is where most of the West's troops are located and
 where the forward defense strategy would be implemented.
 Not only would this limit NATO's training, but it would provide a com-
 parative advantage to the Warsaw Pact's capabilities. The East conducts fewer
 25,000-plus exercises than the West, and those that are held could be distrib-
 uted among the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. This measure
 would not have affected the Warsaw Pact's 1987 and 1988 exercises, while
 NATO would have had to give up seven out of its twelve exercises held in
 1987 and 1988 with 25,000 or more soldiers. Thus, this constraint on numbers
 does not work to NATO's advantage.
 RESTRICT FREQUENCY
 The East's proposal affecting the timing of exercises would not permit more
 than three activities to be held simultaneously on the territory of any state
 (total troops in all must be under 40,000).
 Both in terms of detection and decision-making, this limit would benefit
 NATO. It might aid intelligence somewhat by clarifying Warsaw Pact inten-
 tions if a build-up of troops either in East Germany and Czechoslovakia
 (short-warning attack) or in the Soviet Union (mobilized attack) were staged
 under the guise of simultaneous maneuvers. More important, this constraint
 could promote a NATO consensus to act, by providing Western leaders with
 ready evidence that the USSR had offensive intentions. To mount an attack,
 the Warsaw Pact would have to marshal forces in more than three locations
 in each state, or they would total more than 40,000 troops. Thus, if these
 guidelines were exceeded, firm evidence would be available that Western
 counter-preparations were necessary.
 The problem with this measure is that it would prohibit the current Western
 practice of grouping many exercises in September and October. During Sep-
 tember 1988, NATO held five exercises in West Germany alone, which totaled
 some 240,000 soldiers.93 Restricting this practice would impair NATO's ability
 to defend. In addition, under this limitation, 80,000 troops could be concen-
 trated on the East side of the central border (40,000 in each of the GDR and
 Czechoslovakia), but only 40,000 could be put into the field in NATO's one
 East-West border state, the FRG.
 93. Based on figures of notified activities for 1987-88, supplied by the Arms Control and
 Disarmament Agency on NATO and Warsaw Pact.
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 This proposal would not significantly diminish the impact of training on
 Warsaw Pact capabilities because its maneuvers would not be affected: they
 are more evenly spaced throughout the year. In 1988, the Warsaw Pact held
 maneuvers in nine out of twelve months with three or less in every month
 except April (which had four).94 However, a constraint on timing (accom-
 panied by the size restriction) might complicate the amount of training
 needed to prepare the large number of Category II and III troops that would
 be mobilized for an invasion, although undoubtedly much of this would take
 place below the 13,000-troop notification limit. All in all, this size and timing
 constraint does not serve NATO's interest. It would impair the West's defense
 preparations while leaving the East's peacetime practices essentially un-
 touched.
 LIMIT DURATION
 The Warsaw countries have also advocated allowing no large exercise to run
 longer than 15 days. Such a constraint would benefit NATO early detection
 of a short-warning attack because the amount of war materiel that must be
 gathered for a fifteen-day exercise is significantly different than that for a
 maneuver of thirty days or, of course, an invasion. Thus, build-ups for
 military activities which exceed the duration limit would set off warning
 bells. This measure, however, might not enhance Western leadership decision-
 making, at least in the case of a pre-planned short warning attack, because
 an Eastern invasion could take place within 15 days; thus no provision would
 be violated before the actual attack occurred. In terms of mobilized attack,
 duration would also be relatively unimportant. A long series of shorter or
 non-notifiable training exercises could be used to bring Category II and III
 troops up to speed.
 The impact on NATO defense preparations would be harmful. NATO's
 reinforcement exercises regularly run longer than 15 days and often up to a
 month. This amount of time is needed to transport troops and materiel from
 the United States to Europe, match them with pre-positioned equipment,
 and complete a maneuver. NATO could limit REFORGER to a reinforcement
 exercise without any accompanying activities in the field, but this would
 raise training expenses (because it is more efficient to train the troops once
 they are in Europe), and would lose the training synergy of the movement
 94. Ibid.
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 of troops and materiel from the United States into action in the FRG's forward
 area.
 A 15-day constraint on duration would but little diminish Soviet capabilities,
 as Eastern exercises rarely continue that long. Exercises have, however, lasted
 more than 15 days during times of political crisis in Eastern Europe. This
 suggests that a duration constraint would represent an obstacle for preparing
 significant military operations, such as those undertaken in Czechoslovakia,
 or exerting leverage via military exercises in extended crises. Overall, this
 constraint on duration would not be to the advantage of Western interests
 because it offers few benefits in comparison to the costs of restricting impor-
 tant NATO training practices such as REFORGER.
 RESTRICT LOCATION
 Romania's proposal, for a zone along borders in which maneuvers, move-
 ments, and concentrations would be prohibited, would not improve NATO
 security. This measure would not enhance detection because it would simply
 move what now occurs back toward the Soviet Union. Maneuver-free zones
 would increase the likelihood of a quick NATO decision to respond to aggres-
 sion by establishing a clear measure of ill intent: a violation of the zone. But
 the central problem with this constraint is that it would seriously impede
 NATO's ability to train for and to mount an adequate forward defense. Unless
 the zone on the Eastern side of the inter-German and FRG-Czech borders
 were much wider than NATO's, Pact forces could cross it faster than NATO
 could assume its general defense positions.95 Furthermore, the West's for-
 ward defense policy requires peacetime military activity in the region along
 the border in order to familiarize troops with territory and prepare positions.
 Moreover, eight of NATO's eighteen main exercise areas are located within
 the likely zone, 50 km from the inter-German and Czech borders.96
 The consequences of a location constraint on Warsaw Pact capabilities would
 be minimal, because the East is not tied to a forward defense strategy and
 does not depend on training along the border. In short, a limitation on
 location of exercises does not benefit NATO's security because, unless it is
 95. See Robert D. Blackwill and William Jarosz, "Confidence-Building in Europe: An Assessment
 of Conventional Weapons Exclusion Zones," manuscript, 1989.
 96. These eight NATO exercise areas are Nord-Munster, Sud-Munster, Bergen Hohne, Ehra
 Lessien, Wildflecken, Hammelburg, Grafenwohr, and Hohenfels.
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 highly asymmetrical, it works to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact's offensive
 military planning.
 RESTRICT ACTIVITIES
 A final constraint measure to be considered here involves limitations on the
 activities practiced in exercises. As noted earlier, Soviet maneuvers have
 traditionally focused more on offensive tasks, while the West concentrates
 on logistical tasks related to its reinforcements. The Soviet Union's recent
 statements, that its exercises will be increasingly devoted to defense, further
 suggest that in Moscow's view, activities in exercises can be categorized in
 terms of their offensive or defensive nature. The idea behind a constraint on
 activities, therefore, would be to limit those of the offensive type in order to
 impair the ability of one side to attack the other. This type of constraint
 would, in principle, benefit NATO security, because its implied asymmetry
 would limit the Soviet Union's offensive orientation more than it would affect
 the West's defensive plans.
 In practice, however, the merits of this proposal are questionable because
 of definitional problems related to the terms "offense" and "defense." It is
 difficult to name offensive activities that might not also be a part of defensive
 strategies. Practicing river crossings connotes an offensive activity, yet armies
 on the defensive may need to cross over water obstacles to resupply the
 front lines, retreat, or counterattack. Tactical counteroffensives, even within
 a broader defensive strategy, are necessary to fend off an invasion. Thus,
 even though overall exercise scenarios might be judged offensive or defen-
 sive, the activities which take place within them cannot. This makes it prob-
 lematic to constrain exercise activities in a way that would significantly limit
 the capability to attack, without also inhibiting defensive potential.
 Conclusion
 This analysis of constraint proposals indicates that most of those offered thus
 far would diminish NATO's security. Given current Warsaw Pact quantitative
 advantages, secrecy, and offensive potential, the Atlantic Alliance has good
 reason to be wary of restrictions on its training which could lower its readi-
 ness and ability to respond to aggression. The measures discussed above
 affecting timing, number, duration, and location are undesirable for the West
 because their harm to NATO's ability to defend would outweigh their benefit
 in areas such as early warning, decision-making, and limits on Warsaw Pact
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 capabilities. A constraint on the types of activities practiced in exercises
 appears unfeasible because of the problems of differentiating offensive activ-
 ities from defensive ones. The one proposal that might be desirable, given
 indications that NATO will limit its exercises unilaterally, is a size constraint.
 However, it remains to be seen whether a measure can be developed which
 prohibits Eastern circumvention of its provisions (e.g., by holding several
 simultaneous maneuvers, each of sizes just under the limit), yet does not
 restrict NATO's grouping of exercises in the fall each year.
 This pessimistic view of these specific exercise constraint proposals does
 not mean that all limitations would a priori be detrimental to the West. What
 it does suggest is that, due to important asymmetries between the Warsaw
 Pact and NATO in terms of strategy, force structure, number of allies, deci-
 sion-making capacity, and geography, it is difficult to formulate pragmatic
 constraints that do not asymetrically detract from NATO's capacity to defend
 itself.
 A better starting place for CSBMs on military exercises would be to lower
 the notification floors below the present 13,000, and to increase inspection.
 The purpose of these measures would be to develop a clearer idea of the
 quantity and nature of each side's training, much of which takes place at the
 division level and below. Forces of this size generally do not represent a
 short-warning attack threat, but the overall quantity of training at this level
 can importantly reflect capabilities, if not intentions. As Gorbachev's unilat-
 eral cuts are implemented, the immediate threat of a surprise attack de-
 creases, but the problem of a powerful offensive following mobilization re-
 mains. Lower notification levels, accompanied by more extensive inspections,
 would enhance confidence that the Soviet Union is not undertaking the
 necessary preparation efforts for bringing its large military potential to bear
 in Europe.
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 Appendix: Summaries of Helsinki Accord (1975) and Stockholm Accord (1986)
 The Final Act of the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
 August 1, 1975 (CSCE Helsinki Accord) requests of signatory nations, on a voluntary
 basis:
 a) prior notification of military activities exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, indepen-
 dently or combined with air or naval components;
 b) the designation, purpose, type of activity, numerical strength, and estimated
 duration of such activities;
 c) prior notification of 21 days of military activities, but in the case of a maneuver
 arranged at shorter notice, at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting
 date;
 d) special regard for those countries near the area of maneuvers with respect to
 notification of smaller exercises;
 e) that observers be invited on a voluntary and bilateral basis to attend military
 maneuvers, with special regard for those of countries near the area of such ma-
 neuvers; the inviting state determines in each case the number of observers and
 the procedures and conditions of other participation, and gives other information
 which it may consider useful.
 The Final Act of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
 Disarmament in Europe, September 19, 1986 (CDE Stockholm Accord) requires:
 a) an exchange of data on military activities exceeding 13,000 troops (3,000 if airborne
 or amphibious) or 300 battle tanks, by November 15 of each year; information on
 air forces when more than 200 sorties take place in conjunction with ground
 exercises;
 b) an exchange of preliminary data on any military activity involving more than
 40,000 troops planned for the second subsequent year;
 c) notification at least 13 months prior to military activities with more than 75,000
 troops;
 d) notification 42 days prior to military activities of a size greater than specified in
 (a), but military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved
 (i.e., alerts) are exempt;
 e) notification 42 days prior to transfers of forces from outside the zone to arriving
 points in the zone, and from outside the zone to points of concentration in the
 zone, to participate in military activities exceeding the sizes specified in (a);
 f) observation of military activities of at least 17,000 troops (5,000 if airborne or
 amphibious) by two observers from each member state;
 g) a maximum of three challenge inspections annually, although no state is required
 to accept more than one inspection from the same challenging state in one calendar
 year.
 Thirty-five nations signed each of these Accords. The full texts can be found in J.A.S.
 Grenville and Bernard Wasserstein, eds., The Major International Treaties Since 1945: A
 History and Guide with Texts (London: Methuen, 1987), pp. 482-489.
